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Abstract. The analysis, representation and management of normative conflicts has 
been the focus of much research in recent years, from a variety of perspectives, such as 
distributed systems management, legal reasoning and argumentation, and multi-agent 
interaction. This report is concerned with normative conflicts that arise for agents 
engaging in electronic contracting, and presents a set of primitive conflict patterns. The 
report examines other analyses of normative conflicts and shows how these may be 
seen as instances of these primitives. It proposes a representation of e-contracts in 
Default Logic, which facilitates the detection, prediction and resolution of such nonna­
tive conflicts.
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1 Introduction
The analysis, representation and management of normative conflicts has been the 
focus of much research in recent years, from a variety of perspectives, such as dis­
tributed systems management, legal reasoning and argumentation, and multi-agent 
interaction.
In the early nineties. Sartor’s [29] and Horty’s [15] work on normative conflicts set 
the theoretical basis for conflict management. According to Sartor [29] a conflict 
arises when “(possibly) valid norms establish incompatible qualifications for the same 
concrete state”. The comer stone in this approach is a norm set. This may be either 
inconsistent, if a contradiction is logically derivable from it, or potentially inconsis­
tent, if it may lead to contradiction in an upcoming state. In similar spirit Horty in 
[15, 16] addresses moral conflicts: an agent is in moral conflict if it ought to do an 
action A and, at the same time, it ought to do another action B, but it is impossible to 
do both.
This report is concerned with normative conflicts that arise for agents engaging in 
electronic contracting, within an electronic marketplace. We seek appropriate charac­
terizations for normative conflicts that would enable the detection (and resolution) of 
actual inconsistencies, as well as the prediction (and avoidance) of possible inconsis­
tencies.
Many approaches have emerged during the past decade for the analysis and man­
agement of normative conflicts. Most of them use the deontic notions of obligation, 
permission and prohibition in their analyses and propose that conflict resolution may 
be achieved through the ascription of priorities to norms, based on some criterion 
(e.g. norms may be hierarchically organized through some legal mle, or through some 
domain-specific policy, or through some hierarchy of roles). Moffett et al. [24], Lupu 
el al. [21] and Dunlop et al. [8, 9] address conflicts from the Distributed Systems 
Management viewpoint and view policies as a way to determine and influence man­
agement behaviour. Cholvy et al. [5, 6] view normative conflicts as the result of role 
conflict and propose a solution based on hierarchies of roles. Broersen et al. [4] deal 
with conflicts that arise between an agent’s mental attributes such as beliefs, obliga­
tions, intensions and desires. Kowalski [19] considers normative conflicts that arise as 
a result of conflicting goals and presents an approach that unifies logic and decision 
theory. Finally, Kollingbaum et al. [18] focus on practical reasoning agents and use 
instantiation graphs to detect conflicts.
In this work we investigate an alternative approach, in which we use Reiter’s De­
fault Logic (DAL) [27], We propose the representation of contractual norms as default 
mles, so that we may reason non-monotonically with them. We identify a set of 
primitive patterns for normative conflicts and show how the conflicts identified by 
other researchers may be seen as instances of these primitives. We also identify some 
patterns of normative conflict that have not been identified in other proposals. Fi­
nally, we argue that the representation of contractual norms as default mles facilitates 
both conflict detection (and prediction) and resolution (and avoidance).
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2 Preliminaries
For the purposes of illustration consider an electronic marketplace, populated by 
software agents that establish and perform e-contracts on behalf of some real world
parties. Let the set Agents={Agent\, Agent2, Agent!,.....} denote distinct identifiers
for the various agents, and the set Roles={RA, WA, MA, CA, ... } denote distinct roles 
that agents may assume in the e-market (where RA, WA, MA, CA denote retailer, 
wholesaler, mediator and carrier respectively).
Consider a two-party business transaction. Agent 1 that acts as a retailer orders 
some goods from the wholesaler Agent!. The terms of the agreement between these 
two agents are: Agent! should see to it that the goods be delivered to Agent 1 within 
10 days from commencement (e.g., the date that the order takes place). Agent 1, in 
turn, should see to it that payment be made within 21 days from the date it receives 
the goods. If Agent! does not deliver on time, then a fixed amount is to be deducted 
from the original price of the goods for each day of delay and it should see to it that 
delivery be made by a new deadline. If Agent 1 does not perform payment on time, 
then a fixed amount is to be added to the original price of the goods for each day of 
delay and it should see to it that payment be made by a new deadline.
Following [7], we may take an informal, process view of the business transaction 
that is regulated by the agreement. Each state offers a (possibly partial) description of 
the factual and normative propositions that hold true. A transition between states 
corresponds to an event that takes place, i.e. an action that one of the parties performs 
or omits to perform. Normative propositions of the form:
NN(agent 1, role 1, action, agent2, role2)
express that agent 1 that acts as role 1 is in legal relation NN towards agent2 that acts 
as role! to perform action, where NN may be Obligation, Prohibition, Permission 
and legal Power.
We use Reiter’s Default Logic [27] to represent the norms of an agreement as de­
fault rules. A default rule has the form P:JbJ2, ...JJC, where P is the prerequisite, 
J={J1,J2,... J„} is a set of justifications and C is the derived consequent. If J coincides 
with C, the default rule is called normal. The semantics of a default rule is: If P holds 
and the assumption J is consistent with our current knowledge, then C may be in­
ferred.
For instance, the following default rule expresses that if an order from Agent 1 (act­
ing as a retailer) towards Agent3 (acting as a wholesaler) holds, and it is consistent to 
assume that Agent 1 will become a regular client, then we may infer that Agent3 is 
legally obliged towards Agenl\ to perform delivery:
Order(Agent\, RA, Agent!, WA)
BecomeRegularClient(Agent\) 
Obligation(Agent!, WA, Delivery, Agent\,RA)
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A Default Theory (DfT) is a pair of the form (W, D), where IF is a set of closed for­
mulae that hold, and D is a set of defaults. Rules may be used to compute extensions 
E of the default theory. A rule is applicable to a set of formulae WqE if and only if 
PeE and ~J„<£E. We consider grounded Dffs and we derive extensions in
the manner presented in [2], i.e. by maintaining consistent sets of formulae. This 
derivation may be conducted in stepwise manner.
An agent that engages in some agreement-governed transaction essentially reasons 
with a default theory. At each time point during the business transaction the agent 
attempts to compute the extensions of its current DfT. A normative conflict may be 
detected either between multiple extensions or between some extension and the cur­
rent knowledge (IT) of the agent. Where a conflict is detected between multiple ex­
tensions, the latter represent alternative futures for the agent. Where a conflict is de­
tected between an extension and the current knowledge of the agent, it represents a 
state in which some normative violation occurs. The role of conflict detection is, thus, 
to assist an agent to choose a course of action so that violations may be predicted.
3 Conflict Detection
The first step of conflict management involves the detection of conflicts. To this end, 
in section 3.1, we identify primitive patterns of normative conflict that may be spotted 
during the derivation of extensions of the default theory representation of an agree­
ment. In section 3.2 we discuss other analyses of normative conflicts and show how 
these may be seen as instances of the primitive patterns.
3.1 Primitive Patterns of Normative Conflicts
In what follows we use Obligation, Permission, Prohibition and Power as predicates 
that express normative relations between agents. We do not employ the axiomatiza- 
tion of any particular system of Deontic logic; specifically, we do not employ the 
axiomatization of Standard Deontic Logic, in which these notions are modeled as 
operators that are inter-defined.
A. Conflict between a normative notion (NN) and its negation. The general pattern 
is:
NN(agentX, roleX, action, agent2, role2)
~'NN(agent\, role 1, action, agenf2, role2)
This is the common syntactical conflict that arises when an agent has contradic- 
toiy knowledge. All other approaches, without any exception, refer to this type of 
conflict. In policy-based approaches, when the normative notion is Obligation it 
is called positive-negative conflict of modalities [24], This type of conflict never 
actually arises in our representation, where norms are represented as defaults, be­
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cause the derivation of extensions preserves consistency. It may, however, be 
identified as a potential conflict, when multiple extensions are computed.
B. Conflict between the prohibition to perform an action and the simultaneous per­
mission or obligation to perform the same action. Once again, all previous re­
search approaches refer to this type of conflict. In [24] and [21] these conflicts 
are called conflicts between authority policies (sub-pattem Bl: Prohibition vs 
Permission) and conflict between authority and imperatival policies (sub-pattem 
B2: Prohibition vs Obligation) respectively.
Consider, for instance, the following default theory (W, D) where:
W={Order(Agent\, II I, Agent3, WA)}
and D={
Order{Agent\,RA,Agent3, WA)
WellKnownDebtoilAgent]) 
Prohibition(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agentl, RA)
Order(Agent\,RA,Agent3, WA)
}
Permission(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agentl, RA)
Permission(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agentl, RA)
The first default denotes that if an order from Agent l (acting as retailer) towards 
Agenl3 (acting as wholesaler) holds, and it is consistent to assume that Agent 1 is 
related to a well known debtor then we may infer that Agent3 is prohibited to 
perform delivery. Similarly, the second default expresses that if an order from 
Agentl towards Agent3 holds, and it is consistent to assume that Agent3 is per­
mitted to perform delivery, then we may infer that Agent3 is permitted to perform 
delivery towards Agentl. Agent3 may find itself in a conflicting state after apply­
ing the two defaults sequentially. We denote this type of conflict as B1.
In the same spirit, consider the following DfT:
W={Order(Agentl, RA, Agent3, WA)}
and D={
Order(Agent\, RA, Agent3, WA)
WellKnownDebtoriAgentl)
6
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:36:06 EET - 137.108.70.7
ProhibitioniAgent?, WA, Delivery, AgentX, RA)
OrderiAgent 1, RA, Agents, WA)
ObligationiAgent3, 1F/1, Delivery, AgentX, RA) 
ObligationiAgent?, WA, Delivery, AgentX, RA)
Once again Agent3 is in conflict. We denote this conflict between Prohibition 
and Obligation as B2.
C. Conflict between an obligation to perform action and the simultaneous obligation 
or permission to perform -action. Here -■action denotes a negative action, and 
the issue of representing negative actions has concerned researchers (e.g. [28] re­
gards them as actions that do not lead to the successful fulfillment of a norm). 
We have not developed special semantics for the representation of negative ac­
tions; we merely regard such expressions as denoting either performance of some 
action other than the negative one, or as idleness (non performance of any ac­
tion). This case arises, also, in Lee [20] and Abrahams [1] who use the term 
Waive.
For example consider the following DfT where:
W={Order{AgentX,RA, Agent?, WA)} 
and D={
OrderiAgent 1, RA, Agent3, WA)
BecomeRegularClientiAgentX) 
ObligationiAgent?, WA, Delivery, AgentX, RA)
OrderiAgent I, RA, Agent?, WA)
WellKnownDebtoriAgent 1) 
ObligationiAgent?, WA, -^Delivery, AgentX, RA)
D. Conflict between the power to perform an action and the simultaneous prohibi­
tion to perform the same action. This type of conflict is also referred in [22, 17, 
1]·
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For instance consider the following DfT:
W={Order(Agentl, RA, AgenS, WA)} 
and D={
OrderiAgentl, RA, AgentS, WA)
Power {AgentS, WA, Delivery, Agentl,RA)
Power!AgentS, WA, Delivery, Agent), RA)
Order(Agent\, RA, AgentS, WA)
>(
WellKnownDebtor{Agent\)
Prohibition!AgentS, WA, Delivery, Agentl,RA)
E. Conflict between two obligatory distinct actions, where it is impossible to do 
both at the same time. This corresponds to Horty’s moral dilemma [15].
For instance consider the following DfT where:
W={Order(Agent\, RA, Agents, WA),
Order(Agent2, RA, AgentS, WA),
no simultaneous performance of actions is possible}
and D={
OrderiAgentl, RA, Agents, WA)
BecomeRegularClient(Agent\)
Obi igat ion (AgentS, WA, Delivery1, Agent 1, RA)
Order(Agent2, RA, AgentS, WA, 7T)
}
IsRegularClientiAgent 1)
Obligation(AgentS, WA, Delivery2, Agent2, RA)
AgentS bears two obligations that cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
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F. Conflict between an obligation and the negation of the agent’s permission or 
power to perform it. The negation of an agent’s permission/power to perform an 
action may be explicitly derived from the agent’s knowledge base (sub-pattem 
FI) or it may be derived from a possibly incomplete knowledge base, through the 
absence of explicit information (sub-pattem F2).
For instance consider the following default theory where:
W= {Ordeti Agent 1,RA, Agent?*, WA)}
and D={
Order (Agent 1, RA, Agent), WA)
BecomeRegularClientiAgent 1) 
Obligation(Agent), WA, Delivery, Agent], RA)
OrderiAgent], RA, Agent3, WA)
\>
WellKnownDebtor(Agent 1)
Permission(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent 1. RA)
Now consider a DfT that contains the first of the defaults above and in place of 
the second, the following
OrderiAgent], RA, Agent). WA)
-'Permission{Agen(i, WA, Delivery, Agent], RA) 
^Permission(AgenO, WA, Delivery, Agent], RA)
If the agent’s knowledge base does not contain an explicit permission, then the 
justification of this default will be satisfied.
3.2 Other Analyses of Normative Conflicts
In this section we review some of the main ideas that other researchers have pro­
posed in their analyses of normative conflict and discuss how these may be regarded 
as instantiations of the primitive patterns presented in the previous section. We also 
present some additional cases of nonnative conflict that we have identified, which
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may also be seen as instances of the primitive patterns. Although all the patterns dis­
cussed in this section may be regarded as special cases of the primitive patterns we 
introduced, they merit a separate discussion because they contain additional informa­
tion that may be useful for efficient conflict resolution. We do not show the entire 
DfT, where it is clear that the conflicting norms arise as a result of distinct default 
rules.
3.2.1 Policy-based Conflicts
G. Intra-policy conflicts. Dunlop et al. [8] refer to an internal policy conflict, when 
contradictory policies are assigned to a single role. A policy in their approach 
corresponds to what we call a single norm.
Consider, for example, the two distinct obligations of Agent! (a wholesaler) to 
perform delivery towards two distinct retailers (Agent I and Agent2).
Obligation(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent\,RA)
ObligationiAgent!, WA, Delivery, Agent2, PA)
The conflict arises from the fact that contradictory policies are assigned to 
Agent3 when acting as wholesaler. Apparently, this specific case can be mapped 
onto pattern E. In the same manner, other examples of this kind may be seen as 
instances of other primitive patterns.
H. Inter-policy conflicts. Dunlop et al. [8] refer to an external policy conflict, when 
an agent simultaneously assumes different roles that contradict “in co-existence”.
Consider, for example, that when Agent3 acts as a wholesaler it is obliged to per­
form delivery towards Agent 1 while when it acts as a mediator it is prohibited to 
perform the same action.
Obligation(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent1, RA)
Prohibition(Agent3, MA, Delivery, Agentl, RA)
This specific example can be mapped onto pattern B2.
3.2.2 Role-based Conflicts
I. Intra-role conflicts. Cholvy et al. [5], consider conflicts only among different 
roles. In their approach a role is defined through a set of consistent norms. We 
believe that for a variety of applications it is not realistic to insist on consistent 
role definitions, and thus we accept intra-role conflicts. Typical examples of this 
kind of conflict are authority conflicts [24] and conflicts that are related with the 
notion of power.
Consider the case where Agent3 who acts as a wholesaler is both permitted and 
prohibited to perform delivery towards the retailer Agentl. This inconsistency
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may arise depending on the assumptions that are made, such as the ones pre­
sented earlier on the relation of the retailer with a well known debtor.
PermissionlAgenii, WA, Delivery, Agentl, RA)
Prohibition(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent 1, RA)
Apparently, this case can be mapped onto pattern B1.
J. Inter-role conflicts. Cholvy et al. [5] and Dunlop el al. [8] identify an inter-role 
conflict when contradictory norms arise as a result of multiple roles being as­
signed to an agent.
For example, when Agent/ acts as a carrier it is obligatory to perform delivery. 
If, at the same time, the same agent assumes the role of wholesaler, then such de­
livery is not obligatory.
ObligationiAgent/, C/1, Delivery, Agent\,RA)
-AJbligation(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent\,RA)
This case can be mapped onto pattern A.
Obviously cases G and I, as well as cases Π and J are conceptually related. The re­
spective authors use the terms “policy” and “role” differently, and the only reason for 
discussing them separately is to facilitate comparison.
3.2.3 Conflicts related to Interest/Duty
K. Conflicts of interest. Moffett et al. in [24] define conflicts of interest as the situa­
tion where “the same subject can perform management tasks on two different 
sets of targets”. This type of conflict can be seen as an instance of J (inter-role 
conflict), or H (inter-policy conflict) or the primitive E (conflict between two ob­
ligations).
L. Conflicts of Duty. Moffett et al. in [24] and later Lupu et al. in [21] define con­
flicts of duties and application specific conflicts respectively. They refer to situa­
tions where the same agent should not be allowed to perform two distinct actions 
(e.g. the same agent should not be allowed both to enter a payment and to sign 
the payment cheque). Such conflicts may be seen as instances of J (inter-role 
conflict), or H (inter-policy conflict) or E (conflict between two obligations).
3.2.4 Exceptions
M. Exceptions. This type of conflict arises generally in norm-governed systems. As 
Sartor [29] notes such conflicts emerge when “exceptions to norms state that par­
ticular norms, unambiguously identified, do not apply in a given situation”.
Consider the following DfT where the retailer Agent l who holds a discount card 
orders goods from the wholesaler Agent/. Based on the first default the retailer
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gets a 10% discount due to the discount card. On the other hand, based on the 
second default the retailer should get a 20% discount because it places an order 
during the sales period.
W= {OrderiAgent 1, RA, Agents, HA)}
and D={
OrderiAgent!, RA, Agent'S, WA) 
λ HasDiscountCard(Agent\, RA)
Obligation{Agent2, WA, Discount/0%, Agent!, RA) 
Obligation(Agent3, WAJDiscountl 0%, Agent!, RA)
OrderiAgent 1, RA, Agents, WA) 
λ Sales?eriod
Obligation(Agent3, WA, Discount20%, Agent!, RA) 
(Jbligation(Agent3, WA,Di.scount20%, Agent!, RA)
3.2.5 Temporal Normative Conflicts
Dunlop et al. [8] present a temporal logic based approach for the detection of norma­
tive conflicts. In this section we present briefly a modification of our representation 
of agreements in DfL, which takes into account the external time of a norm (i.e. the 
time at which it comes into force) and the internal time of a norm (i.e. the time stipu­
lated for its satisfaction, its deadline) (cf. [23]). A formula of the form:
NN{agent!, role!, action, time2, agent2, role2, time!)
denotes that at time point time 1 agent! (acting as role 1) is in legal relation NN to­
wards agent2 (acting as role2) to perform action by time2.
Now, we may discuss normative conflicts of the types described by the primitive 
patterns B-F, in a temporal setting. For the purposes of illustration consider the primi­
tive pattern E, in which the following norms are in conflict:
ObligationiAgenii, WA, Delivery, IT!, Agent!, RA, ET!)
Obligation(Agent3, WA, Delivery, IT2, Agent2, RA, ET2)
where IT!, and ET! are the intemal/extemal time points for the first norm, and IT2, 
ET2 are the intemal/extemal time points for the second norm. Temporally well 
formed norms are those whose internal time is subsequent to their external time, so
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each normative proposition corresponds to an interval; the intervals for the example 
we use here are 771 =[£71, ITl] and 772=[£72, 772],
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
ET1 ITl
ET2 IT2
ET1 ITl
ET2
ET1
ET2
ET1
I
ET2
ET1
ET2
ET1
_i_
ITl
A_____. t
IT2
ITl
IT2
ITl
I
IT2
ITl
~T~
IT2
ET2
T~
IT2
Figure 1 Time interval-based conflicts
N. A conflict arises in the following situations (these are depicted as shadowed in 
figure 1):
(i) ET\ =£72 andIT\ =772: when 771 coincides with ATI (Figure 1(a)).
(ii) £71 < £72 < 772 < 771: when 771 fully overlaps 772 (Figure 1(b), 1(c) 
and 1(d)).
(iii) £71 <£72 <771 <772: when 771 partially overlaps 772 (Figure 1(e)).
(iv) 771 = £72: when 771 meets 772 (Figure 1(f))· This conflict holds only at 
time point IT\ = ET2.
Note that for completeness, one should also consider the symmetrical cases.
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3.2.6 Additional Patterns
Here are some additional cases of normative conflict that we have identified, which 
are not discussed already in the existing literature. We mention them separately be­
cause, although they may be reduced to the primitive patterns, there is additional 
information that may be exploited to facilitate conflict resolution.
O. Type of action-based conflicts. A common feature of e-contracts is the so called 
Contrary-to-Duty structures [26], An agent’s contractual obligations may be di­
vided in two types. Prima facie obligations that concern the performance of ac­
tions that are in principle stipulated by the agreement and secondary obligations 
that concern the performance of reparatory actions; the latter apply only when 
violations of prima facie obligations happen.
An agent may, thus, bear two distinct obligations (for instance of the kind de­
scribed by G or E), where one is primary and the other is secondary. This qualifi­
cation may be helpful in conflict resolution, as will be discussed in section 4.
P. Agreement-based conflicts. An agent may find itself in a conflicting state be­
cause it is engaged in multiple contracts. For instance a wholesaler may be 
obliged to perform two distinct deliveries to two distinct retailers as dictated by 
two distinct agreements. This situation may be regarded as the generalization of 
patterns G and E discussed earlier, because in this case the important information 
is the distinction between the contracts. The additional information that the two 
norms stem from two agreements, may be exploited for the purposes of conflict 
resolution. Note that this conflict pattern is different form the one presented in 
[14]. The key notion here is the different contracts an agent has to comply with. 
Different contracts may be established towards different agents or even towards 
the same agent.
Q. Conflicts between assumptions and knowledge. A conflict may arise not only as 
a result of an agent’s explicit knowledge but also between its knowledge and its 
current assumptions.
For example, according to the following DfT the prohibition that derives from 
the second default contradicts not only with obligation that derives from the first 
default, but also with the assumption of the first default (power).
W= {OrderiAgent 1, RA, Agent3, WA)}
andZ>={
OrderiAgent],, RA, Agent3. WA)
Power(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent 1, RA) 
Obligation(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent], RA)
14
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Order)Agent I, RA, Agents, WA)
WellKnownDebtoriAgent 1) 
Prohibition(Agent3, WA, Delivery, Agent\,RA)
4 Conflict Resolution
Various approaches for conflict resolution have been proposed in the last decade. It 
seems that the common ground for most of them is the ascription of priorities to 
norms [29, 18], policies [24, 21, 9], roles [6], based on some criterion, which may be 
domain dependent or independent. Belief revision [29], goal reduction and decision 
based on utility [19], and conflicting provision voidance [1] are some of the other 
proposed strategies for conflict resolution.
Conflict resolution in DfL may be performed using Brewka’s [3] proposal that en­
ables us to define and apply priorities on default rules dynamically.
Brewka defines a Preferential Default Theory (PDfT) as a triple (W, D, name), 
where name is a function that assigns names to default rules D. The extension of a 
PDfT is derived in the same way as in a DfT.
What makes PDfTs really useful is that the ascription of priorities to default rules 
may, itself, be done dynamically. Using dynamic priorities, we generate preferred 
extensions, each of which indicates a transaction plan. Priorities amongst ground 
defaults may be defined dynamically either by making different assumptions or by 
specifying domain-dependent criteria. The general pattern for ascribing priorities 
dynamically takes the form of a default rule:
Rule(d\, vl) λ Ruleidl, v2) λ criterion
assumptions
d\<dl
Here d 1, dl are variables that denote names of ground defaults; Rule(d\,v\) de­
notes a ground default c/1 and its set of entities of interest vl. The intended interpreta­
tion of this rale is: if two defaults d\ and dl apply and some criterion is satisfied 
between entities of interest, then d 1 takes priority over dl, if certain assumptions may 
consistently be made.
Three general strategies for defining such criteria have been discussed in the litera­
ture, namely hierarchies of entities of interest, time and specificity of norms. Table 1 
summarizes one possible way in which the patterns of normative conflicts that we 
discussed may be used by specific strategies. Given a particular normative conflict,
15
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different resolution strategies may be applied depending on our specific criterion of 
interest.
Table 1 Resolution Strategies for Normative Conflict Patterns
Strategy Conflict Pattern Criterion
Hierarchy
• Primitive normative con­
flicts
• Inter-policy/inter-role con­
flicts
• Conflict of duties/interests
• Agreement-based conflicts
• Type of action-based con­
flicts
• Conflicts between assump­
tions and knowledge
e.g. prohibitions over­
rides all other norma­
tive notions, explicit 
knowledge overrules 
assumptions, obliga­
tions to reparatory ac­
tions should be met 
first, a regular client 
has priority
Temporality
• Time interval-based con­
flicts
e.g. the oldest obliga­
tion takes priority, or 
the shortest deadline 
takes priority
Specificity
• Exceptions e.g. the most specific 
rule overrides all oth­
ers
For instance, consider the case where two norms (D\ and D2) that define conflict­
ing obligations for Agenfi are active. The first one is initiated at ET1 and it is towards 
retailer Agent 1 who is a regular client. It sets an obligation to perform delivery until 
ITl. The second one is towards retailer Agent2, it is initiated at ET2 and defines a 
reparatoiy obligation to perform delivery until IT2. The relation between time points 
is as follows: ETl < ET2 < ITl < IT\. There is information that can be used to deter­
mine different conflict resolution criteria. The strategy of temporality based on exter­
nal time may give priority to D\ as it was initiated first. On the other hand, temporal­
ity based on internal time may give priority to 1)2 since it has a shorter deadline. 
Another alternative, using the strategy of hierarchy is to give precedence to D\, be­
cause Agent 1, as a regular client, takes precedence over Agent!. Or, we may give 
precedence to D2, because it concerns a reparatory action, if we choose to assign 
higher priority to secondary norms over primary ones. It should be clear that various 
combinations of these criteria may also be defined based on the agent’s current 
knowledge and the assumptions it makes.
Finally, a fourth general strategy may also be applicable, by exploiting the fact that 
we employ DfL: an agent may ascribe priorities between default rules, based on the 
number of assumptions used. For instance a cautious agent may give priority to rales 
with fewer assumptions, while a risky agent may give priority to rales with more 
assumptions.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
The analysis, representation and management of normative conflicts has been the 
focus of much research in recent years, from a variety of perspectives.
Moffett et al. [24], Lupu et al. [21 ] and Dunlop et al. [8, 9] address conflicts from 
the Distributed Systems Management viewpoint by specifying policies as a way to 
determine and influence management behavior. We have shown how the basic types 
of conflict presented in these approaches may be seen as instances of our primitive 
patterns in DfL. Both [24] and [21] focus on the detection and resolution of syntactic 
conflicts at compile-time, by proposing static priority assignment. On the other hand, 
work in [8, 9], which addresses temporal reasoning about conflicts, concentrates on 
run-time conflict detection. Our approach is intended for conflict detection and reso­
lution at run-time. Cholvy et al. in [5, 6] accept only inter-role conflicts and propose a 
solution that is based on the concept of role and regulation respectively. Contrary to 
this approach we accept intra-role conflicts and have shown how their conflict pat­
terns map onto our primitive ones. None of the above approaches supports defeasible 
reasoning.
Broersen et al. in [4] deal with different kinds of conflicts: they are interested in 
conflicts arising between an agent’s beliefs, obligations, intensions and desires. Al­
though they, too, use DfL, they only use normal defaults, thus requiring agents to 
have complete knowledge. They do not address conflicts in a temporal setting. Other 
approaches, such as [13, 12, 25], that also support nonmonotonic reasoning with e- 
contracts do not presented in detail a discussion on the conflict patterns they consider 
and priorities are statically defined.
Abraham and Bacon in [1] examine normative conflicts but their focus corre­
sponds to only a part of our set of primitive patterns. Although the absence of implicit 
knowledge is mentioned as a conflicting pattern (our pattern F), no resolution is pro­
posed because no assumption-based reasoning is supported. Kowalski [19] is con­
cerned with goal-driven conflict detection and resolution and attempts to unify logic 
with decision theory.
Our current work focuses on developing a computational tool based on Reiter’s 
DfL and its major variations, that supports temporal defeasible reasoning as well as 
conflict detection and resolution as presented in this report and in [10, 11], We also 
find Kowalski’s proposal to use decision theory attractive as a means to derive pre­
ferred extensions.
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